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Background: Abnormal decision-making processes have been observed in patients with major depressive disorder
(MDD). However, it is unresolved whether MDD patients show abnormalities in decision making in a social
interaction context, in which decisions have actual influences on both the self-interests of the decision makers
per se and those of their partners.
Methods: Using a well-studied ultimatum game (UG), which is frequently used to investigate social interaction
behavior, we examined whether MDD can be associated with abnormalities in social decision-making behavior by
comparing the acceptance rates of MDD patients (N = 14) with those of normal controls (N = 19).
Results: The acceptance rates of the patients were lower than those of the normal controls. Additionally, unfair
proposals were accepted at similar rates from computer partners and human partners in the MDD patients, unlike
the acceptance rates in the normal controls, who were able to discriminatively treat unfair proposals from
computer partners and human partners.
Conclusions: Depressed patients show abnormal decision-making behavior in a social interaction context. Several
possible explanations, such as increased sensitivity to fairness, negative emotional state and disturbed affective
cognition, have been proposed to account for the abnormal social decision-making behavior in patients with MDD.
This aberrant social decision-making behavior may provide a new perspective in the search to find biomarkers for
the diagnosis and prognosis of MDD.
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Major depressive disorder (MDD) is characterized by a
persistent and overwhelming feeling of sadness [1]. Emo-
tional processes, including emotional response and feel-
ing states, are an important factor with a prominent
impact on decision making [2,3]. Previous studies have
found that the abnormal feeling state in patients with
MDD may bias their decision-making behaviors, as evi-
denced from altered sensitivity to reward and punish-
ment [4-7], reduced experiences of regret [8], and poor
decision performance [9]. Despite these important find-
ings in MDD, all these studies have investigated people
in non-social interaction contexts, in which actions only
have consequences for the self-interests of the partici-
pants [4-8]. However, many real-life decision problems* Correspondence: zhouyuan@psych.ac.cn
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stated.involve social exchanges with other individuals and a
certain division of economic outcomes among them
[10]. The influence of the depressive state on real-life
economic decisions has rarely been studied in a social
interaction context. Considering that MDD affects up to
20% of the worldwide population [11,12], the influence
of the depressive state on social-economic decisions is
an important research question. Ecologically valid social
decision-making paradigms such as the ultimatum game
(UG) may help identify suboptimal choices associated
with MDD and, thus, may provide a potential bridge for
translation research in MDD [13-15].
The UG is a commonly used paradigm to study the
process of decision-making in a social interaction con-
text [16]. In the UG, a proposer suggests a way to divide
a fixed sum of money. The responder has to accept or
reject the proposal. If the responder accepts the pro-
posal, the suggested split is realized. If the respondertd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication
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the UG, the payoff-maximizing strategy for the re-
sponder (individual level) is to accept all offers, and, re-
ciprocally, for the proposer it is to make the smallest
possible offer [16]. However, behavioral experiments
from different countries with different stake sizes and
different experimental designs confirm that people do
not always pursue their own maximum profit [17]. Em-
pirically, approximately half of all unfair offers (defined
as approximately 20% or less of the pot) are typically
rejected, with increasing rejection rates as offers become
less fair [18].
Convergent evidence from psychophysiological mea-
sures of emotional arousal [19], behavioral studies on
emotional regulation [20-22] and neuroimaging studies
[2,23] have documented the role of negative emotion in-
duced by unfair proposals in explaining this rejection be-
havior observed in the UG. Recent studies have found
that temporally changing the baseline emotion or base-
line biological states of responders also influences the ul-
timatum bargaining behavior [24-26]. For example, one
recent study found that inducing incidental sadness de-
creased the acceptance rates of unfair offers in the UG
[24]. Other studies found that taking medications that
decreased or enhanced serotonin levels could make
healthy subjects less or more likely to accept unfair of-
fers, respectively [25,26]. In addition, unfair offers elic-
ited activity in brain areas related to emotion, such as
insula and amygdala [2,23]. All these lines of evidence
elucidated the role of emotion in ultimatum bargaining
behavior. Therefore, we hypothesized that administering
the UG task to MDD patients could reveal deviations in
their social interactions from those of a healthy popula-
tion based on the following knowledge about MDD: (1)
MDD is characterized by persistent sadness [1]; (2) sero-
tonergic neurotransmission dysfunction is the major
pathophysiological hypothesis of this disorder [27,28];
and (3) structural and functional abnormalities in nega-
tive emotion-related brain areas, such as the insula and
amygdala, have been found in MDD [29,30].
To our knowledge, four studies have addressed this
issue, but the results were inconsistent [13,31-33]. Agay
et al. (2008) used a two-stage UG paradigm, in which
participants played two rounds with the same anonym-
ous opponents, to compare the bargaining behavior of
schizophrenic patients with that of MDD patients and of
a healthy control group. They found that the acceptance
rate of the MDD group was significantly lower than that
of the normal control group in the first round and nu-
merically lower in the second round [31]. Using a single-
shot UG paradigm, Harlé et al. (2010) found that
although depressed individuals reported a more negative
emotional reaction to unfair offers, they accepted signifi-
cantly more of these offers than did the controls [32]. Inaddition, Destoop et al. (2012) found no significant dif-
ference in acceptance rate between severe MDD patients
and their healthy controls, although their patients
showed a numerically lower acceptance rate [33]. How-
ever, in a recent study Scheele et al. (2013) found that
compared with healthy controls depressed patients
rejected significantly more moderately unfair offers in
the UG and rated emotional stimuli as more negative
[13]. Therefore, how patients with MDD treat unfair
proposals in the UG is still unresolved.
Additionally, no previous studies have investigated
whether patients with MDD discriminate between unfair
proposals from human partners or computer partners.
Studies conducted in healthy populations have found
that healthy participants often reject an unfair offer from
a human partner but tend to accept the same unfair
offer from a computer partner [19,23]. The discrimina-
tive responses for unfair proposals from computer part-
ners and human partners argue against the equity
model, which holds that subjects’ sense of fairness only
depends on whether the distribution is equal [34,35], but
they provide a strong evidence for the reciprocity model
[36,37]. The reciprocity model posits that a strong recip-
rocator will punish norm violation behavior to consoli-
date fairness norms in the social group [36,37], but
when the distributor is a computer, the social quality of
the interaction is missing, and thus, the reciprocity effect
disappears [38]. This indicates that decisions in the UG
depend not only on material gains but also on consider-
ations of other agents’ outcomes and intentions [39].
This view has been supported by neuroimaging evidence,
which suggests that successful discrimination in responses
regarding unfair proposals from computer partners and
human partners depends on the intact social cognitive
ability, especially the ability to understand and respond to
the thoughts and feelings of others [40]. Therefore, a para-
digm that includes both human and computer partners
may be helpful to improve our understanding of impaired
social cognition in patients with MDD. However, in previ-
ous MDD studies the participants only played the game
with human partners, not with computer partners, leav-
ing unresolved the problem of whether MDD patients
can discriminate between unfair proposals from human
partners and computer partners.
Furthermore, the offer size changed and the total
amount of money to be divided was kept constant in
previous UG paradigms, so this type of experimental de-
sign mixed fairness and monetary reward. To control for
monetary reward, we planned to fix the value of the
offer size and to vary the stake size across trials. By
keeping the offer size stationary, we can isolate effects of
fairness and the size of the offer separately.
The goal of the present study was to examine whether
MDD can be associated with abnormalities in decision-
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paring the acceptance rate of a group of patients with
MDD with that of healthy controls in a UG task in
which both human and computer offers were included.
We mainly investigated the decision characteristics of
MDD patients from the following two aspects: (1)
whether there was a difference in acceptance rates be-
tween patients with MDD and normal controls in the
UG task and (2) whether patients with MDD could treat




This study was approved by both the Institutional Review
Board of the Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of
Sciences, and the Medical Research Ethics Committee of
the Second Xiangya Hospital. All participants gave written
informed consent.
Participants
Fourteen patients were recruited from the Institute of
Mental Health, Second Xiangya Hospital of Central
South University. The patients satisfied the DSM-IV cri-
teria for a major depressive episode, as diagnosed inde-
pendently by two qualified psychiatrists who interviewed
the patients personally. The psychiatrists had received
DSM-IV training for the diagnosis of mental disorders
and passed the assessment of consistency prior to the im-
plementation of this study. The patients were excluded if
they had any preexisting or concurrent co-morbid pri-
mary diagnosis that met the DSM-IV criteria for any Axis
I disorder other than MDD. Additional exclusion criteria
were acutely suicidal or homicidal behavior, family his-
tory of major psychiatric or neurological illness in first
degree relatives, history of trauma resulting in loss of
consciousness, history of major neurological or physical
disorders that could lead to an altered mental state, or
current pregnancy or breastfeeding. All the clinical par-
ticipants were inpatients, except one who was an out-
patient. Four of the participants were patients with first-
onset MDD, and others were in the relapse phase. The
mean frequency of episodes was 1.43 (SD = 0.65) times.
The mean age of onset was 28.8 (SD = 15.5) years old.
The mean duration of illness was 46.1 (SD = 55.7)
months. In the MDD group, only one patient did not take
any psychotropic medication; the other patients received
antidepressant medications (SSRIs and/or SNRIs), with
four patients additionally taking low-dose benzodiaze-
pines and one patient receiving neuroleptics. Nineteen
healthy participants were recruited via advertisement as a
control group. The control subjects were free of any
known psychiatric condition and had never taken any
form of antidepressant medication, as screened by a self-reporting questionnaire. Additional exclusion criteria
adopted for the normal controls (NC) were the same as
those for the MDD group. Immediately before the UG
task, the depressive symptoms of the participants were
rated by an experienced research physician using the 24-
item Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HDRS; [41]). All




Decision making encompasses a complex set of processes
that requires various higher-order cognitive functions [42].
Previous studies have shown that patients with MDD have
impaired cognitive function, although the conclusions are
inconsistent [43]. To exclude the potential impact of cog-
nitive dysfunction on decision-making behavior in MDD,
a cognitive assessment of all subjects was conducted be-
fore the UG task. The Digit Symbol and Information sub-
tests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Chinese
Revision (WAIS-RC) were used. The Digit Symbol subtest
requires that subjects write down symbols that correspond
with figures one to nine in 90 seconds, which reflects a
person’s memory and speed of processing. The Informa-
tion subtest requires participants to answer some common
questions, which reflects a person’s range of general infor-
mation. A similar cognitive assessment was performed in
a previous study [13].
Ultimatum game
The UG task was conducted individually, so participants
were unable to discuss the research experience with each
other. The participants first received instructions explain-
ing the rules of the game, and each participant was re-
quired to complete a series of test questions after reading
the instructions to verify their comprehension. In the for-
mal experiment, the participants acted as responders in a
series of trials of the UG, during which they might play
with a computer or with a person. Each trial had 5 phases
(Figure 1). The participants were informed that proposals
from real persons had been submitted by previous partici-
pants and that in each trial their partners would be differ-
ent (a one-shot game). They were also told that the
proposals from the computer were randomly generated.
In reality, all the offers were pre-set by the experimenter.
In addition, they were told that we would also submit their
proposals after the experiment and that their proposals
might be adopted in future plays of the game. In reality,
the participants’ proposals were not used beyond their
function as a cover story. Moreover, to avoid uncontrolled
associations, the human proposers were represented by al-
phanumerical codes, not by their pictures or by real
names. Previous studies have found that the decisions of
responders in the UG can be influenced by the features of
Figure 1 Diagram illustrating the structure of a single round of the ultimatum game. Each round began with a 2 s preparation interval.
The participant then saw the number of the proposer (e.g., P01) or computer for 4 s. Next, a pie indicating the offer proposed by the partner was
displayed for a further 6 s. The participant was given the choice to respond by pressing one button to accept and another to reject the offer
with no time limit for this process. Then the result of the choice showed for 4 s.
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and facial emotion [45]. The type of presentation of hu-
man proposers we used had been successfully used in a
previous UG study [46].
Each responder received 36 offers, 18 of which were
supposedly from playing the game with human partners
and 18 with computer partners. The offers from the
computer partners were identical to those from the hu-
man partners, and the rounds were presented randomly.
To keep the monetary reward constant and avoid mak-
ing participants feel bored, we independently manipu-
lated fairness and basic monetary reward (offer size) by
varying both the offer amount and the stake size across
the trials (Table 1). Two offer sizes (ұ10, ұ4) were prof-
fered, and the offers fell into one of three “fairness” cat-
egories: 50%-40% of the stake (fair), 33%-25% of the
stake (unfair), or 20%-10% of the stake (most unfair).
Thus, there are six combinations of offer size and fairness
in each proposer condition, and 3 rounds were set for each
combination. Thus, we had 18 trials in each proposer con-
dition. The number of rounds in each fairness condition is
comparable with several previous studies [23,47]. In differ-
ent trials, the same offer amount could represent a larger
percentage of the total stake and could, therefore, seem
fair, or it could represent a smaller percentage of the total
amount and could, therefore, seem unfair. This design con-
trolled for any effects of offer magnitude. Thus, this study
was a 2 × 2 × 2 × 3 design, with diagnosis (MDD, NC) as
a between-subjects factor and proposer (human, computer),
offer size (ұ10, ұ4) and fairness (50%-40%, 33%-25%,Table 1 Types of offers
Fair Unfair Most Unfair
(50%-40%) (33%-25%) (20%-10%)
High (ұ) 10 10 10
out of 20, 22, 25 out of 30, 35, 40 out of 50, 70, 100
Low (ұ) 4 4 4
out of 8, 9, 10 out of 12, 14, 16 out of 20, 24, 4020%-10%) as within-subjects factors. We implemented a
random payment method in our experiment. Participants
were informed that, after the task, they would be paid in
cash based on two randomly chosen offers out of all the
proposals.
Questionnaire
After completing the UG task, the participants rated the
fairness of all offers presented in the UG task on a Likert
scale of 1 (very unfair) to 7 (very fair). The goal of this task
was to ensure that the participants’ fairness evaluation cri-
terion was consistent with our classification standards.
Then, to increase the degree of their involvement in this
experimental situation, they also made offers as proposers
with different stake sizes, and we told them their proposals
would be used in the subsequent study.Statistical analysis
For the analysis of the sample characteristics and the
cognitive tests, Student’s t-tests were performed to com-
pare means, whereas chi-square tests were used to com-
pare frequencies.
A 2 (diagnosis: MDD, NC) × 3 (fairness: 50%-40%, 33%-
25%, 20%-10%) repeated measures ANOVA was used to
test the differences of fairness judgment between the two
groups. To compare the differences in acceptance rates, a
2 (diagnosis: MDD, NC) × 3 (fairness: 50%-40%, 33%-25%,
20%-10%) × 2 (proposer: human, computer) × 2 (offer size:
ұ10, ұ4) repeated measures ANOVAwas conducted. The as-
sumption of sphericity was assessed with Mauchly’s test.
Partial eta-squared and Cohen’s d were calculated as
measures of effect size. When significant effects were found,
we conducted post-hoc pairwise Least Significant Difference
(LSD) tests.
A partial correlation controlling for age, gender and
years of education was used to explore the association be-
tween the acceptance rate and depressive severity as
indexed by the HDRS scores in the patient group. All re-
ported p values are two-tailed or one-tailed if a prior
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lished. Values of p < .05 were considered significant. The
statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS 17.0.
Results
Demographic and clinical data
The major depressive disorder patients (MDD) and nor-
mal controls (NC) did not show significant differences in
terms of gender composition, age, and educational level
(all p > .05). The mean HDRS score showed a highly sig-
nificant difference between the two groups (p < .001). No
significant differences were found between the groups in
their performance on the Digit Symbol and Information
portions of the WAIS-RC (both p > .05), suggesting that
our MDD patients did not show significant cognitive dys-
function in memory, speed of processing, or common
sense (Table 2).
Fairness judgment
To confirm our division of the fairness of each offer and
to test for potential differences in justice sensitivity, a re-
peated measures ANOVA, considering the diagnosis and
fairness categories, was conducted. Mauchly’s Test of
Sphericity showed the sphericity assumption was met
(p = .163). The results showed a significant main effect
of the fairness category on the participants’ ratings of
the fairness of the offers (F(2,62) = 195.78, p < .001, par-
tial η2 = .863; all possible pairwise comparisons were sig-
nificant, all p < .001), indicating that the fairness
assessment standards of the subjects were consistent
with our division. In addition, the main effect of diagno-
sis was marginally significant (F(1,31) = 4.11, p = .051,
partial η2 = .117). Because we were more concerned
about the group difference in fairness judgment of unfair
and most unfair offers, we conducted subsequent inde-
pendent sample t-tests. The results showed a marginally
significant group difference in fairness ratings of unfair
offers (MDD: M = 3.70, SD = 1.09; NC: M = 4.36, SD =
1.10; t(31) = −1.70, p = .099, Cohen’s d = .602) and aTable 2 Demographic and clinical details
Characteristic MDD group NC group
(n = 14) (n = 19) T /χ2 a pa
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Age 32.6 (16.1) 32.9(14.1) −0.061 0.952
Gender (male:female ratio) 6 : 8 9 : 10 0.066 0.797
Years of education 12.9 (2.5) 14.2 (3.4) −1.254 0.219
HDRS 21.0 (1.1) 4.6 (1.7) 31.071 <0.001
WAIS-RC: Digital Symbol 57.1 (7.9) 60.1(13.3) −0.819 0.419
WAIS-RC: Information 16.8 (4.9) 17.7 (3.5) −0.571 0.572
WAIS-RC: Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Adult-Chinese Revised.
HDRS: Hamilton Depression Rating Scale.
aResults of t-test and χ2 statistics and corresponding levels of
significance (two-tailed).significant group difference in fairness ratings of most
unfair offers (MDD: M = 1.81, SD = 0.50; NC: M = 2.76,
SD = 1.53; t(22.89) = −2.54, p = .018, Cohen’s d = .785)
(Figure 2). These results showed that although the pa-
tients could also differentiate fairness levels from differ-
ent proposals, they demonstrated greater sensitivity to
unfairness.
Acceptance rates of UG
The acceptance rate was investigated by a repeated mea-
sures ANOVA, exploring the main effects of diagnosis,
fairness, proposer type, offer size and the interaction ef-
fects between these factors. Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity
showed that the sphericity assumption was met (all
p > .05). Significant main effects of fairness (F(2,62) =
87.18, p < .001, partial η2 = .738; all possible pairwise com-
parisons were significant, all p < .001), offer size (F(1,31) =
6.97, p = .013, partial η2 = .184) and diagnosis (F(1,31) =
4.87, p = .035, partial η2 = .136) were found. Thus, the ac-
ceptance rate decreased when offers became less fair and
the acceptance rate was lower facing a lower monetary
payoff than facing a higher payoff. In addition, the accept-
ance rate was lower in MDD than in NC. We did not find
any significant interaction effects. Because we were more
concerned about the group difference in acceptance rates
of unfair and most unfair proposals, we conducted subse-
quent independent sample t-tests. The results showed a
marginally significant group difference in acceptance rates
of unfair proposals (MDD: 60%, NC: 79%; t(31) = −1.89,
p = .068, Cohen’s d = .662) and a significant group differ-
ence in acceptance rates of most unfair proposals (MDD:
20%, NC: 42%; t(31) = −2.06, p = .048, Cohen’s d =
.725) (Figure 3). The MDD patients exhibited abnormalFigure 2 Comparison of scores on the fairness ratings in the
ultimatum game. Error bars represent the SE of the difference of
the means.
Figure 3 Effects of offer fairness on acceptance rates by each
group in the ultimatum game. Error bars represent the SE of the
difference of the means.
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than-normal acceptance rates of the unfair proposals.
Previous studies have found that unfair offers made by
human partners were accepted at a significantly lower
rate than the same offers made by a computer [19,23].
To validate and explore the proposer effect in each
group, a paired sample t-test of the proposers was con-
ducted on the unfair and most unfair offer levels to
evaluate the offer sizes separately in light of the signifi-
cant effect of offer size on acceptance rate. The most un-
fair offers made by the human partners were accepted atFigure 4 Behavioral results of normal controls (A) and patients with m
rates (%) plotted as a function of offer sizes for different proposers. Error baa significantly lower rate than the same offers made by
the computer partners in the NC group when the offer
size was smaller (t(18) = 2.73, p = .014, Cohen’s d = .555).
However, no differences between human and computer
partners were found in the MDD group (t(13) = −0.01,
p = .992, Cohen’s d = .002). When the offer size was lar-
ger, no significant proposer effect was found in either
group at the most unfair offer level (Figure 4). At the
unfair offer level, we did not find any significant effect
for proposer type in either group at either offer size.
Comparing the total monetary amount of all offers
accepted in the study groups using an independent sample
t-test, we found that the subjects in the depressed group
earned less money (M = 149.43, SD = 54.21) than those in
the control group (M = 185.68, SD = 43.42) and that the
difference reached significance (t(31) = −2.13, p = .041,
Cohen’s d = .751). For the response time in the UG task,
an independent sample t-test showed that there was no
significant difference in response time between the two
groups (t(31) = −1.02, p = .315, Cohen’s d = .360).
Clinical correlates analysis
The correlation between the acceptance rates and symp-
tom severity, as indexed by the HDRS scores in the pa-
tient group, was analyzed by partial correlations with
age, gender and years of education as control variables.
In general, a significant negative relationship was found
between the patients’ acceptance rates and their clinical
severity of depression (ρ = −0.589, p = .028, one-tailed).
Moreover, we did not find any significant correlations
between the acceptance rates and other clinical features,
such as the duration of illness or age of onset.ajor depressive disorder (B) to the most unfair offers. Acceptance
rs represent the SE of the difference of the means. *p < .05.
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The goal of this study was to examine whether patients
with major depressive disorder show abnormalities in
decision-making behavior in a social interaction context,
in which their decisions influence both the self-interests
of the decision makers per se and those of their partners
[48], by investigating their acceptance rates in the UG.
Our results showed that (1) the acceptance rates of the
patients were lower than those of the normal controls
and (2) no differences in acceptance rates to unfair pro-
posals were observed in the MDD group while compar-
ing their response to offers from humans with those
from computers. Taken together, our findings indicated
that the MDD patients showed impaired bargaining be-
havior when playing the UG.
Previous studies have observed mixed findings in the
social decision-making behavior of depressed patients in
the UG task. Both decreased and increased acceptance
rates by depressed patients have been reported
[13,31-33]. Our study supported a decreased acceptance
rate of unfair proposals by MDD patients. We specu-
lated that the inconsistency in the ultimatum bargaining
behavior of MDD patients may be due to sample hetero-
geneity. In the only study that reported higher accept-
ance rates in a depressed group, the participants were
recruited from an undergraduate student sample and
were typically young, unmedicated patients, and 4 out of
15 had subthreshold MDD [32]. In our study and the
other three studies [13,31,33] that reported statistically
or numerically decreased acceptance rates in depressed
groups, the patients were from a purely clinical popula-
tion, and most of the patients were taking antidepressant
medications. The mixed findings suggest a discrepancy
in severity of the disorder (moderate versus more severe
forms of depression). Consistent with this speculation,
we found a significant negative relationship between pa-
tients’ acceptance rates and their clinical severity of de-
pression. This suggests that the severity of depression
influences the ultimatum bargaining behavior of MDD
patients. Additionally, the mixed findings suggest a role
of antidepressant medication in the ultimatum bargain-
ing behavior in MDD patients. A single-dose antidepres-
sant has been found to increase acceptance rates in
healthy participants [26]. Along this line, it seems pos-
sible that antidepressant medication will increase accept-
ance rates, yet antidepressants may have a different
impact on the brain of depressed patients than on the
brain of healthy controls. Long-term antidepressant ef-
fects on ultimatum bargaining behavior with treatment-
naïve MDD patients should be studied in the future.
Several possibilities have the potential to explain the
decreased acceptance rate observed in our MDD pa-
tients. First, MDD patients may perceive fairness differ-
ently from others. When judging the fairness of theoffers, the patients tended to judge an offer as less fair
than did the normal controls, especially in the most unfair
condition. This suggests that MDD patients may be more
sensitive to fairness and are thus more likely to decide to
reject unfair offers. This explanation is consistent with the
speculation that a person’s sense of justice is a prerequisite
for the rejection of unfair offers [49]. A second possible
explanation is that the background emotional state may
play an important role when making decisions. Previous
studies have found that latent emotional states can alter
people’s goals, attitudes, and risk perceptions, and some
work, albeit limited, has been performed on how differ-
ently valenced emotions can influence social decision
making [50,51]. Much empirical literature has illustrated
the significant role of both task-related and induced emo-
tion in decision-making behaviors in the ultimatum bar-
gaining game [19,23,24]. Our study showed that the
background negative emotional state seemed to alter the
behavioral pattern of MDD patients in their social interac-
tions, a finding that provides further evidence supporting
the role of emotion in decision making.
A potential physiological mechanism for the decreased
acceptance rate observed in MDD may be serotonin
(5-HT) deficiency, which has been identified in MDD
patients [27,28]. Recent studies have found that 5-HT
plays a critical role in social decision-making behaviors
and is a demonstrably powerful force shaping our social
lives [25,26,49,52]. Crockett et al. observed that healthy
volunteers were more likely to reject unfair offers after
lowering their 5-HT levels with acute tryptophan deple-
tion and less likely to reject unfair offers after enhancing
5-HT levels with citalopram [25,26]. Another study
showed that individuals with a low level of serotonin
transportation in the dorsal raphe nucleus were more
likely to be honest and trustful, could not tolerate unfair
offers, and thus were more likely to engage in personally
costly forms of retaliation [49]. In addition, structural
and functional dysfunction in the brain regions that play
an important role in ultimatum bargaining behavior
could be a neural basis for the decreased acceptance rate
in MDD patients. Neuroimaging studies have indicated
that specific regions associated with deliberative pro-
cesses, cognitive conflict and emotional processing, such
as the insula, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the an-
terior cingulate cortex and the amygdala [2,23,53,54],
may underlie the neural basis of a responder’s decision
behavior in the UG. All these regions have shown struc-
tural and/or functional abnormalities during depressive
episodes [29,30]. Future studies need to clarify whether
neural dysfunction causes the difference between the ul-
timatum bargaining behavior of people with MDD and
that of normal controls.
Another important finding in the present study is that
the MDD group showed no differences in acceptance
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normal controls who accepted the most unfair (20%-10%
of the stake size) offers with a lower offer size at a sig-
nificantly lower rate when they were proposed by human
partners than when the same offers were proposed by
computer partners. This indicates that MDD patients
merely care about offer fairness regardless of whether
the proposer was a computer or human and seem not to
consider reciprocity. In a healthy population, more
seems to be tolerated in terms of behavior and actions
from agent actors (computers) than from human actors
[55]. For the indiscriminate treatment of unfair pro-
posals from human partners and computer partners in
the MDD group, we proposed several possible explana-
tions. First, this abnormal decision behavior we observed
may be related to the disturbed affective cognition,
which is a major characteristic of patients with MDD
(for reviews, see [56-60]). Specifically, MDD patients
tend to attend selectively to negative stimuli in their en-
vironment and to interpret neutral or ambiguous stimuli
as negative or as less positive. This negative bias has
been observed in facial emotion processing, memory
and attention, and the social and moral emotion of pa-
tients with MDD (for a review see [59]). We speculate
that the negative bias also exists in decision making in a
social interaction context in MDD. It is possible that
negative bias is activated by unfair proposals, causing
negative cognition to be automatically induced. This
negative cognition thus makes patients with MDD neg-
lect the non-social information of the computer and
focus on the inequality per se. Thereby, they may inter-
pret proposals from computer partners as negatively as
they do those from human partners. Second, impaired
social cognition may also play a role in the indiscrimin-
ate treatment of unfair proposals from human partners
and computer partners in the patients with MDD.
Researchers have found that intact social cognition, es-
pecially theory of mind, plays a critical role in distin-
guishing between unfair proposals from computer
partners and human partners [40]. Participants need to
understand and respond to the thoughts and feelings of
others in the human proposer condition, while they do
not need to conjecture the intentions of computers in
the computer proposer condition. Previous studies ex-
ploring the social cognition of MDD have shown that
depressed subjects showed impaired ability to conjecture
the intentions of others [61-63]. It is possible that the
dysfunction in social cognition makes MDD patients
treat the human proposer and computer proposer indis-
criminately. Additionally, we noted that our results ob-
tained in the patients with MDD were similar to those
obtained in patients with a lesion in the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), who also did not distinguish
unfair offers from human and computerized opponents[10]. Considering that vmPFC is a brain region that
is necessary for valuing social information in social
interaction and decision-making [10,64], Moretti et al.
think that the ability to value social information is im-
portant for the discriminate treatment of human pro-
posers and computer proposers [10]. Abnormal
structure and function in the vmPFC have been consist-
ently reported in patients with MDD [65-67]. Therefore,
it is possible that the indiscriminate treatment of human
and computer proposers in MDD is related to the im-
paired functions which should be served by the vmPFC,
such as valuing social information during interactive de-
cision making. These speculations also need to be tested
in future studies.
Strengths and limitations
A strength of this study was our experimental design.
On the one hand, we included human and computer of-
fers and found aberrant features of decision making in
MDD patients when facing unfair proposals from human
partners and computer partners, which has never been
explored. On the other hand, we set up two types of
offer size (high and low) and varied the stake size across
trials, so we investigated the effects of fairness and offer
size separately, which were usually mixed in previous
studies.
Meanwhile, several issues should be addressed. First,
our sample size was small. To explore how likely the dif-
ference in acceptance rates between the two groups and
those between human and computer proposers in each
group is reliable, we conducted Bayesian t-tests for ac-
ceptance rates in different conditions using a Bayes
factor calculation [68]. Our results revealed that the al-
ternative hypothesis of a group effect on acceptance rate
was 2.0 times more likely to be true than the null hy-
pothesis of no group effect. In addition, we found that
the alternative hypothesis of a proposer effect on accept-
ance rate was 4.2 times more likely to be true than the
null hypothesis of no proposer effect in the NC group,
while the null hypothesis of no proposer effect on ac-
ceptance rate was 2.8 times more likely to be true than
the alternative hypothesis of a proposer effect in the
MDD group. These results provide additional evidence
for the group difference in acceptance rates of UG and
distinguishing between unfair proposals from computer
partners and human partners in the NC group but not
the MDD group. Although the Bayes factor calculation
showed some statistical power to detect existing effects,
our findings still need to be validated repeatedly by fu-
ture studies with larger sample sizes. Second, it is a flaw
that we did not collect the data about socio-economic
status and average salary of the participants and did not
explicitly assess the meanings of each stake size for par-
ticipants. However, according to the average annual
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stationary offer sizes we used, even though they seem to
have little difference on the surface, may have different
meanings for these participants. Our finding that the
offer size affected the rejection rate of unfair proposals
supports this possibility and suggests a magnitude effect
of offer size. In order to reach a firm conclusion about
the magnitude effect of offer size, future studies should
collect the data about socio-economic status and average
salary of the participants, explicitly assess the meanings
of stake size for participants and/or increase the differ-
ences in magnitude between offer sizes. Third, all but
one of the patients in our study were taking antidepres-
sant medications, which may confound our results.
Future studies with drug-naïve MDD patients may dis-
tinguish the effects of medication on ultimatum bargain-
ing behaviors from the effects of disease per se. Another
future direction could be to compare the ultimatum bar-
gaining behaviors of MDD patients before and after anti-
depressant medication treatment. Fourth, depression is
often accompanied by symptoms of anxiety, which also
has an impact on ultimatum bargaining behaviors [70].
Future studies need to control the effect of anxiety on
social decision-making. Finally, anhedonia and sadness
are separate major characteristics of MDD; however, dif-
ferent pathophysiological mechanisms underlie these two
symptoms [28,71]. Patients with different symptoms may
show differences in their ultimatum bargaining behaviors.
It has been demonstrated that sadness plays an important
role in biasing decision making [19,23,24], while anhedo-
nia is related to decreased reward sensitivity, which
appears to underlie a failure to maximize potential mon-
etary earnings [72]. Future studies should investigate the
relationship between specific symptoms of MDD and ul-
timatum bargaining behaviors.
Conclusions
In summary, our findings provide further evidence sup-
porting the role of emotion in decision making. More im-
portantly, our findings indicate that depressed patients
show altered decision-making behavior in social inter-
action contexts. Our findings also indicate an influence of
clinical symptoms on everyday decision making in MDD
patients, an issue that has been neglected but is obviously
important to their lives. Future studies should further in-
vestigate the possible mechanisms, such as perception of
fairness and the neurobiological basis, behind patients’ im-
paired social decision making. While it remains to be seen
whether these aberrant decision characteristics can be val-
idated in large independent studies, the preliminary find-
ings reported here suggest the possibility that abnormality
in the social decision-making process could be a potential
marker for MDD diagnosis and prognosis. Many psychi-
atric disorders are related to one or more abnormaldecision-making processes [73,74]. Therefore, a better un-
derstanding of these decision-making processes will un-
doubtedly improve the diagnosis and treatment of mental
illness, and in turn, studies about unusual or aberrant
decision-making behavior in patients may further promote
an understanding of normal decision-making behavior.
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